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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, by virtue of the 
lack of general applicability of its individual mandate, violates the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment by forcing some individuals to personally pay a 
separate abortion premium in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
Amici curiae are three national organizations whose members include 
physicians, health care professionals and medical students with a profound interest 
in defending the sanctity of human life in their dual roles as both health care 
providers and consumers.   Amici vigorously oppose abortion as contrary to 
traditional, historical and Judeo-Christian medical ethics, as well as to their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.   
As professionals with a vocation to serve every member of the human 
family, Amici are sensitive to healthcare disparities and are supportive of a variety 
of public, private, and charitable efforts that address health care affordability and 
accessibility.   However, Amici have a profound interest in opposing the Act 
because its imposition of the non-neutral individual mandate forces them in some 
                                                
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, Amici certify that all parties have consented to the 
filing of this brief; no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in 
part; and no person other than Amici contributed money intended to fund the 
brief’s preparation or submission. 
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health plans to make separate personal payments for elective abortion in violation 
of their sincerely held religious beliefs and moral convictions.   Amici include the 
following medical associations: 
Catholic Medical Association (CMA) is a nonprofit national organization 
founded in 1932 to assist Catholic physicians in upholding the principles of their 
faith in the science and the practice of medicine and in witnessing to these 
principles within the medical profession, the Church and society at large. 
Comprised of over 1,500 members covering over 75 medical specialties, CMA 
helps to educate the medical profession and society at large about issues in medical 
ethics, including health care rights of conscience, through its annual conferences 
and quarterly journal, The Linacre Quarterly; supports Catholic hospitals in 
faithfully applying Catholic moral principles in health care delivery; and helps 
Catholic physicians to collaborate and support one another in their common goal of 
providing conscientious health care that respects the dignity of the human person. 
Christian Medical and Dental Association (CMDA) is a nonprofit national 
organization of Christian physicians and allied healthcare professionals with over 
16,000 members.  In addition to its physician members, it also has associate 
members from a number of allied health professions, including nurses and 
physician assistants. CMDA provides up-to-date information on the legislative, 
ethical and medical aspects of defending conscience in health care for its members 
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and other healthcare professionals, as well as for patients, institutions, and students 
in training.  CMDA is opposed to the practice of abortion as contrary to Scripture, 
a respect for the sanctity of human life, and traditional, historical and Judeo-
Christian medical ethics. 
Medical Students for Life of America (“MedSFLA”) is a nonprofit 
national organization of future medical professionals committed to sustainable 
patient healthcare improvement and ethical medicine. MedSFLA is an 
unincorporated subdivision of Students for Life of America, representing a 
combined 620 student groups in 48 states. The mission of MedSFLA is to highlight 
a rediscovery of the patient-doctor relationship with care for every patient – 
regardless of race, developmental stage, socioeconomic status, and special needs. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
Amici urge affirmance of the district court ruling, and present an additional 
argument that demonstrates the unconstitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act2 (“the Act”):  its individual mandate, which is not generally 
applicable, imposes an “abortion premium mandate” that violates the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. 
The “individual mandate” found in Section 1501 of the Act provides that, 
beginning in 2014, Americans must either purchase federally-approved health 
insurance or pay a monetary penalty.   Nestled within this “individual mandate” are 
provisions collectively referred to herein as the “abortion premium mandate,” 
which, as addressed in Section A, offend Amici’s most basic principles of 
morality, and substantially burden their free exercise of religion. 
As addressed more fully in Section B of this brief, the Act sought to include 
plans that cover abortion, while attempting to segregate funds to avoid the 
appearance of federal funding of abortion.   It achieved this under Section 1303 by 
mandating that the issuer of a federally subsidized plan that covers elective 
abortions “shall” obtain a separate and private payment from every enrollee, 
                                                
2 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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without exception, to be used by the insurer solely for the payment of other 
people’s elective abortions. Act, § 1303(b)(2)(B).    
In conjunction with the forced purchase required by the individual mandate, 
Section 1303’s abortion premium mandate directly encumbers the conscience and 
free exercise rights of millions of Americans by imposing an unconstitutional 
burden on them within the private insurance marketplace.  Members of Amici 
medical associations and their similarly-situated patients are subject under the Act 
to being unwillingly enrolled by their employer in a plan that covers abortion; or 
alternatively, Amici have their choices impermissibly limited under the Act by 
being forced to choose between plans that respect their conscience versus other 
plans that may better meet their health needs or their choice of doctor network, but 
would require them to personally pay an abortion premium. 
Although such government imposed burdens might arguably be permissible 
if imposed through a neutral and generally applicable law under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), they are 
impermissible here because the Act as a whole—and the individual mandate in 
particular—are not generally applicable.  As discussed in Section C, Section 1501 
provides express statutory exceptions to the individual mandate for certain 
religious objections, but not for religious objections to abortion.  The lack of  
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general applicability is further demonstrated by the hundreds of waivers to the 
individual mandate granted by the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services on a case by case basis.  Because the Act and its individual 
mandate do not meet Smith’s neutral and general applicability standard, it is 
subject to strict scrutiny, a standard it cannot meet. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I.  THE ACT AND ITS NON-NEUTRAL INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE BY 
IMPOSING AN “ABORTION PREMIUM MANDATE” 
WITHOUT REGARD TO RELIGIOUS OBJECTION 
 
 
A. Our nation has a long and deeply-rooted history of 
respecting and protecting the conscience rights of 
individuals not to be forced into the practice or funding of 
elective abortion  
 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the sensitive and emotional nature of 
the abortion controversy” provokes “vigorous opposing views” and inspires “deep 
and seemingly absolute convictions.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).  The 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is replete with the understanding that the 
practice of human abortion has “profound moral and spiritual implications,” 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992), and that “men and women 
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of good conscience can disagree” about those implications and can find abortion 
“offensive to [their] most basic principles of morality.”  Id.    
Although legal, this Court has recognized that “reasonable people” will 
differ as to the morality of abortion, id.at 853, and “there are common and 
respectable reasons for opposing it.”  Bray v. A lexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 
506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).   Indeed, as recently as the 2000 Carhart decision, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[m]illions of Americans believe that life 
begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death 
of an innocent child,” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000). 
In the wake of Roe, federal and state laws were quickly enacted to ensure 
that no provider or hospital should be forced to participate in abortions against 
their will.  A full forty-seven states3 have enacted laws to protect health care 
practitioners’ right of conscience to some degree or another, many providing full 
exemptions to any health care practitioner who conscientiously declines to 
participate in abortion. See, e.g., Fl. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111(8) (“No person . . . who 
shall state an objection to such procedure on moral or religious grounds shall be 
required to participate in the procedure which will result in the termination of 
                                                
3 See, e.g., Protection of Conscience Project, States and Territories, available at 
http://www.consciencelaws.org/laws/usa/law-usa-01.html (last visited May 7, 
2011). 
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pregnancy.”).4  In many ways, the widespread agreement to protect provider 
conscience is unique in our history, and ranks the right of individual conscience in 
the abortion area as, in fact, fundamental.5 
A similar history from Roe to the present arises on the question of whether 
individual taxpayers may be forced to contribute to abortion services with their tax 
dollars.  Responding to the conscience objections of millions of Americans, 
Congress endeavored from 1976 onward to make clear with the annual passage of 
a budget rider known as the Hyde Amendment that while Roe had made abortion 
legal, federal funds collected from taxpayers would not be used for elective 
abortions.6   The Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae, 
                                                
4 For a broader discussion of the widespread adoption of such conscience 
provisions in the wake of Roe v. Wade, see Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional 
Right to Refuse:  Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Healthcare 
Providers, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 39 (forthcoming October 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1749788 (last visited April 29, 
2011). 
 
5See Rienzi at 10-11, supra note 4 (“In light of the long history of legal and ethical 
prohibitions on abortion in many contexts until the 1970s, and the repeated, nearly 
unanimous, and nearly universal legislative actions to protect objectors after Roe,  
this Part concludes that a right to refuse to participate in abortions satisfies the 
Court’s traditional analysis for protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”)    
 
 
6 Consistent with a legal analysis of the Act by the Office of the General Counsel 
for the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the phrase “elective abortion” is used 
in this brief to refer to abortions that have long been ineligible for federal funding 
in major health programs – specifically, all abortions except for cases of rape, 
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448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980), recognizing that “[a]bortion is inherently different from 
other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful 
termination of a potential life.”7 
                                                                                                                                                       
incest, or danger to the life of the mother.  The term is used here not as an 
expression of medical or moral judgment, but rather as shorthand for longstanding 
federal policy.    For a cogent yet comprehensive analysis of how the Act impacts 
abortion funding and conscience issues beyond the “abortion premium mandate” 
addressed in this brief, see Anthony Picarello and Michael Moses, Legal Analysis 
of the Provisions of the Patient Protection and A ffordable Care Act and 
Corresponding Executive Order Regarding Abortion Funding and Conscience 
Protection, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (March 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.usccb.org/healthcare/03-25-10Memo-re-Executive-Order-
Final.pdf (last visited May 7, 2011)(“USCCB Memo”). 
 
7 The Court has since eschewed this inaccurate “potential life” terminology and 
instead used terms such as “ending fetal life,” and recognizing the state’s interest 
in “protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus.” Gonazles v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992),.  In 
fact, the Gonzales majority was unequivocal in recognizing that abortion destroys a 
separate human life when it stated: “It is, however, precisely this lack of 
information concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of 
legitimate concern to the State.  The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a 
choice is well informed.”  Id. at 159 (emphasis added). 
 
This is supported by modern developmental biology establishing that at every 
phase of human embryonic and fetal development, the unborn child is not a 
“potential life,” but rather an individual human being. See, e.g., William Larsen, 
Human Embryology 4 (3rd ed. 2001)(explaining that male and female sex cells 
“unite at fertilization to initiate the embryonic development of a new 
individual.”)(emphasis added); see also Maureen L. Condic, Ph.D., When Does 
Human Life Begin? A  Scientific Perspective, Westchester Institute White Paper 
(October 2008), available at 
http://www.westchesterinstitute.net/images/wi_whitepaper_life_ print.pdf (the 
human zygote (single cell phase) has “all the properties of a fully complete (albeit 
immature) human organism; it is ‘an individual constituted to carry on the 
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To be clear, Amici emphasize that this brief does not address the hotly 
debated issue of whether the Act enables direct federal funding of elective abortion 
due to the omission of a Hyde-like amendment.8  Nor does it address future threats 
to the conscience protections of healthcare providers due to the omission of 
longstanding conscience protections that were not applied to the Act’s separate 
funding stream.9  Despite the important and valid concerns surrounding federal 
funding of abortion or threats to provider conscience, the speculative nature of how 
the Act might or might not be implemented in the future makes these issues not yet 
ripe for judicial review.  See, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 
(1967). 
                                                                                                                                                       
activities of life by means of organs separate in function but mutually dependent: a 
living being.’”(citing the Medical Dictionary of the National Library of Medicine, 
available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/mplusdictionary.html). 
 
8 See USCCB Memo, supra, note 6.   
 
9 Id; See also Michael A. Fragoso, Note, Taking Conscience Seriously or Seriously 
Taking Conscience?:  Obstetricians, Specialty Boards, and the Takings Clause, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV.  101, 114 (forthcoming July 2011) (“As the PPACA contains 
its own revenue stream (not relying on general omnibus Congressional 
appropriations), the Hyde-Weldon and Church Amendments would not 
apply to it.  Further, the Act was passed without a comprehensive conscience 
rider—although Senator Tom Coburn (an obstetrician) of Oklahoma proposed one.  
The result is that the Act contains the potential to contravene established 
physicians’ conscience protections in the area of reproductive health in its 
regulatory interpretation.”); see also, Helen Alvare, How the New Healthcare Law 
Endangers Conscience, June 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/06/1402 (last visited April 29, 2011).  
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Rather, this brief focuses narrowly on the concrete provisions of the Act’s 
“abortion premium mandate” that substantially burden the conscience and free 
exercise rights of millions of Americans.   
B.  The “Abortion Premium Mandate” violates conscience and 
free exercise rights by forcing enrollees in certain health 
plans to personally pay a premium to a private insurer 
dedicated to covering other people’s elective abortions.  
 
The “individual mandate” that compels Americans by threat of penalty to 
purchase only federally-approved health insurance plans results in the imposition 
of another unconstitutional mandate: the “abortion premium mandate.”   
Under Section 1303 of the Act, all individuals who, even unwittingly, are 
enrolled in a plan – either on their own or by their employer – that happens to 
include elective abortion coverage must pay a separate premium from their own 
pocket to the insurer’s actuarial fund designated solely to pay for other people’s 
elective abortions.   
Section 1303(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Act refers to elective abortions as “Abortions 
For Which Public Funding is Prohibited” ( “elective abortions”).10  The Act then 
provides that the issuer “shall estimate the basic per enrollee, per month cost, 
determined on an average actuarial basis, for including coverage under a qualified 
health plan of the services described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) [i.e., elective 
                                                
10 See USCCB Memo, supra note 6, addressing “elective abortions” as any 
abortion other than in cases of rape, incest or danger to the life of the mother.  
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abortions].”  Act,  §1303(b)(1)(D)(i).  Section 1303(b)(1)(D)(ii) mandates that the 
abortion premium mandate shall not be estimated “at less than $1 per enrollee, per 
month.”   
The enrollee must separately pay the abortion premium from his or her own 
private funds by virtue of the provision of the Act stating that in plans covering 
elective abortion, “the issuer of the plan shall not use any amount attributable to” 
either tax credits or “cost-sharing reductions” for “the purposes of paying for 
[elective abortion] services.” Act, § 1303(b)(2)(A). 
The abortion premium mandate applies without exception for Americans 
who have conscience objections to abortion, and even without the ability for 
enrollees to decline abortion coverage for any reason, even on the basis that the 
enrollee is a man who would never need reimbursement for an abortion. Act, § 
1303 (b)(2)(B)(i) (abortion premium “shall” be collected “without regard to the 
enrollee’s age, sex, or family status.”).  
Ironically, the offending language arose out of an attempt by Senator Ben 
Nelson, a pro-life Democrat, to find language that would “make it clear that [the 
healthcare bill] does not fund abortion with government money.”11  After first 
                                                
11Abortion Haggling Looms Over Health Care Debate in Senate, (November 10, 
2009), available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/10/abortion-
haggling-looms-health-care-debate-senate#ixzz1LF6XshKX (last visited May 2, 
2011). 
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threatening a filibuster unless the Senate version included the pro-life Stupak 
amendment that mirrored the Hyde Amendment, Senator Nelson later agreed to 
accept certain negotiated language.  Now codified at Section 1303 of the Act, the 
“Nelson Compromise” allows the federal government to break with former federal 
policy12 by allowing Americans to use federal tax credits and subsidies to buy 
plans that include abortion coverage, provided that their federal subsidies are not 
applied by insurance companies toward the abortion coverage in such plans.  As 
explained above, this was achieved by mandating enrollees in such plans to make a 
separate payment from their own private funds to an insurance account designated 
solely for the payment of other people’s elective abortions. 13  The “abortion 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
12 The Act is not in accord with the consistent federal policy since 1996.  As 
explained by the Heritage Foundation before passage of the Act: 
The FEHBP (Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan) provides 
insurance for millions of federal workers, including Members of 
Congress. Administered through the federal Office of Personnel 
Management, FEHBP lets workers choose from a variety of different 
health insurance plans, but since1996 the law has required all of these 
plans to exclude abortion coverage, excepting only rape, incest and 
the life of the mother. And it’s not just FEHBP. Military insurance 
through TRICARE does not cover abortion unless the mother’s life is 
at risk. Nor does the Indian Health Service. 
Ernest Istook, The Real Status Quo on Abortion and Federal Insurance, The 
Heritage Foundation (November 11, 2009), available at 
http://blog.heritage.org/2009/11/11/the-real-status-quo-on-abortion-and-
federal-insurance/ (last visited May 5, 2011). 
 
13 Another part of the compromise was the inclusion of “State Opt-Out of 
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premium mandate,” although not referred to as such, was accurately described by a 
court in the Western District of Virginia:  
In plans that do provide non-excepted [elective] abortion14 
coverage, a separate payment for non-excepted [elective] abortion 
services must be made by the policyholder to the insurer, and the 
insurer must deposit those payments in a separate allocation account 
that consists solely of those payments; the insurer must use only the 
amounts in that account to pay for non-excepted [elective] abortion 
services. Act § 1303(b)(2)(B), (C).  
Insurers are prohibited from using funds attributable to 
premium tax credits or [federal] cost-sharing reductions … to pay for 
non-excepted [elective] abortion services. Act § 1303(b)(2)(A). 
 
Liberty University v. Geithner,  2010 WL 4860299, at *24 (W.D. Va. Nov. 
30, 2010).15 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Abortion” provision.  Under Section 1303(a), a “State may elect to prohibit 
abortion coverage in qualified health plans offered through an Exchange in such 
State,” but a State may later “repeal” such law “and provide for the offering of 
[abortion] services through the Exchange.”  As of the filing of this brief, only eight 
states had enacted “opt-out” laws:  Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia.  See NCSL, Health Reform and Abortion 
Coverage in the Insurance Exchanges (April 2011), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21099 (last visited May 5, 2011). 
 
14 The court is using the phrase “non-excepted” to describe elective abortions (all 
abortions other than those in cases of rape, incest or life of the mother). Act, 
§1303(b)(1)(B); see also USCCB Memo, supra, note 6.  
 
15 The federal district court in Liberty University v. Geithner focused on the 
provisions that prohibit federal subsidies from being applied to abortion coverage, 
missing the point of plaintiffs’ argument about the unconstitutional nature of 
compelling individuals to personally pay into a segregated private abortion fund 
against their consciences and sincerely held religious beliefs.   
 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 21 of 30
15 
 
Thus while Section 1303 cleverly (though superficially) avoids the direct use 
of taxpayer funds to pay for elective abortions, it does so by forcing private 
individuals to fund them directly from their own pockets, and without regard to 
conscientious objection to the direct and personal funding of abortion.  
To make matters worse, the Act does not require clear and sufficient 
advance notice of which plans in the Exchange contain coverage for elective 
abortion.  In fact, the Act seems to provide to the contrary, such that Americans 
could easily be forced by the individual mandate into the unwitting purchase of an 
abortion plan that causes them to personally pay for elective abortions, against 
their sincerely held religious beliefs: 
(3) RULES RELATING TO NOTICE.—  
(A) NOTICE.—A qualified health plan that provides for coverage of 
the services described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) [elective abortion] shall 
provide a notice to enrollees, only  as part of the summary of benefits 
and coverage explanation, at the time of enrollment, of such 
coverage.  
(B) RULES RELATING TO PAYMENTS.—The notice described in 
subparagraph (A), any advertising used by the issuer with respect to 
the plan, any information provided by the Exchange, and any other 
information specified by the Secretary shall provide information only 
with respect to the total amount of the combined payments  
for services described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) [elective abortion] and 
other services covered by the plan.  
 
Act, § 1303(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
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The Act and its individual mandate thus forces Amici and citizens with 
similar religious beliefs and moral convictions into the untenable position of 
having limited health insurance choices.  In order to have the same choices as other 
citizens, the members of the Amici medical organizations must be willing to 
violate their consciences by entering into private contracts – possibly unwittingly 
or unwillingly – with private insurers in which they must actively cooperate with 
their personal funds in the payment of elective abortions. 
C.  The Act and the Individual Mandate are invalid because they 
are not generally applicable and fail  strict scrutiny. 
 
For many of the millions of Americans who oppose abortion, being forced 
by the government to pay for abortions – not with tax dollars, but directly out of 
their own pockets – will violate their deeply held religious beliefs or moral 
convictions.  As the Supreme Court has explained: 
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon 
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a 
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and 
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the 
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is 
nonetheless substantial. 
 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).   
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 23 of 30
17 
 
Accordingly, the individual mandate combined with the abortion insurance 
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the Free Exercise rights of millions of 
Americans. 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), the government is generally free to impose substantial burdens on 
religion, so long as those burdens are imposed by neutral and generally applicable 
law.  Here, however, the burden is imposed by a law that does not meet Smith’s 
neutral and generally applicable standard.  Accordingly, the individual mandate 
that imposes the abortion premium mandate is subject to strict scrutiny under the 
Free Exercise clause, a standard it cannot meet. 
First, as has been well-documented in the media, the Act is rife with 
exceptions and the Department of Health and Human Services has granted 
hundreds of waivers from its provisions on a case by case basis.16  By definition, 
the existence of such a system of waivers renders the law not generally applicable. 
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537-
38  (1993)(“As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which individualized 
                                                
16See, e.g., Making Exceptions in Obama’s Health Care Act Draws Kudos, and 
Criticism, Robert Pear, The New Y ork Times, March 20,  2011 at A21 (noting 
waivers “for more than 1,000 health plans covering 2.6 million people. . . 
.[E]xceptions like these have become increasingly common. They provide wiggle 
room in a law originally thought to be strict and demanding.  Maine has just won a 
three-year reprieve from a provision of the law . . .”). 
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exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government ‘may not 
refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling 
reason.’ Respondent's application of the ordinance's test of necessity devalues 
religious reasons . . . by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious 
reasons.  Thus, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory 
treatment.”). 
Second, the individual mandate itself is subject to several exceptions 
allowing individuals to opt-out for various reasons—including some apparently 
government-approved religious reasons—but not for religious objection to 
personally funding abortion.  For example, section 1501 of the Act exempts from 
the individual mandate those who are members of a “recognized religious sect or 
division” with “established tenets or teachings” barring the “acceptance of benefits 
of any private or public insurance.”  Section 1501 also exempts other groups, 
including those participating in “health care sharing ministries,” native Americans, 
and the poor. The existence of these exceptions demonstrates that the government 
does not actually need to force every individual to purchase healthcare insurance.  
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547 (no compelling interest where government “fails to 
enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or 
alleged harm of the same sort”).  
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In light of these waivers and exemptions, it simply cannot be said that the 
Act is a generally applicable law.  Simply put, the law does not apply generally at 
all.  Accordingly, the Act is subject to strict scrutiny.   
Here, the Act itself shows that there is no compelling interest in forcing all 
Americans to purchase health insurance.  Both the statutory exceptions and the 
hundreds of waivers confirm that the individual mandate clearly does not need to 
be imposed in every case, and that the government judges some reasons (though 
apparently not conscientious objection to abortion) to be sufficiently important to 
trump its interests.  See, e.g., Lukumi 508 U.S. at 546 (strict scrutiny failed where 
the “proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious 
conduct”).  As such, the Act’s individual mandate that imposes an abortion 
premium mandate is invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the final judgment of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Florida should be affirmed. 
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